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Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to design optimal contracts allowing a vertical supply chain to exactly replicate the pro…t performance, R&D investments and product quality level of a vertically integrated monopolist in a dynamic model where quality improvement requires costly R&D e¤orts by the …rms along the vertical channel or by di¤erent divisions of the same …rm under vertical integration. Before illustrating the contents of the ensuing analysis, I brie ‡y o¤er an overview of the context in which our contribution inserts itself.
The downward distortion of product quality in monopoly markets is a long-standing issue in the theory of industrial organization. The incentive for a monopolist to undersupply quality in order to increase its own ability of extracting surplus from consumers has been highlighted by Spence (1975) and Mussa and Rosen (1978) and then further investigated by several other authors. 1 Quality supply has also repeatedly received attention in the …elds of operations research, marketing and management, 2 where it has been often connected with the optimal coordination of supply chains. 3 The latter aspect refers to the fact that the quality level characterising the …nal product, as seen from the consumers's viewpoint, is indeed the outcome of the contributions (in the form of advertising or R&D) of di¤erent …rms along the supply chain, 1 The related literature is too large to be exhaustively accounted for. See Itoh (1983) , Maskin and Riley (1984) , Besanko, Donnenfeld and White (1987) and Champsaur and Rochet (1989) , inter alia. For a survey, see Lambertini (2006) . 2 The bulk of the related literature is summarised in Feichtinger, Hartl and Sethi (1994) and Jørgensen and Zaccour (2004) . 3 In these disciplines, product quality is sometimes treated as an equivalent of goodwill Here, I compare a vertically integrated monopolist with two divisions investing to increase product quality versus the alternative industry structure in which the product quality level is the outcome of the e¤orts of two independent …rms connected along a vertical supply chain. In the latter case, the contractual relation takes the form of a two-part tari¤ which may be designed in several alternative ways, thereby generating di¤erent outcomes.
The model is de…ned in continuous time, over an in…nite horizon. It is therefore an optimal control model when a vertically integrated …rm is considered, and a di¤erential game with sequential moves at every instant if instead two independent …rms are assumed to exist along the supply chain. From an analytical point of view, the procedure follows the same steps as in Lambertini (2014), where an analogous approach is used to design optimal contracts in a supply chain where …rms have to build up goodwill over time. 5 The main results can be spelled out as follows. After characterising the 4 The hold-up phenomenon arising under opportunistic behaviour is a major issue in the theory of the …rm ever since Williamson (1975 Williamson ( , 1979 e¢ cient outcome engendered by the vertically integrated …rm, the distortion induced by vertical separation is illustrated, to the e¤ect that the sum of upstream and downstream R&D e¤orts do not match those taking place across divisions belonging to an integrated monopolist, and equilibrium quality consequently decreases. Then, it is shown that a two-part tari¤ consisting of an exogenously given fee combined with a wholesale price set at marginal cost creates a hold-up problem inducing the upstream …rm not to invest at all in quality-increasing activities. As a consequence, the vertical channel falls short of the performance of the vertically integrated monopolist, which is instead attained modelling the …xed fee as an endogenous function of either (i) the R&D e¤ort of the upstream …rm, or (ii) the quality level itself. While being equally e¤ective at …rst sight, these two alternative contractual designs may indeed be not entirely equivalent. This is because the quality level being developed along the supply chain may not be observable or veri…able along the chain itself (as well as by the …nal customer before purchasing), and therefore the alternative contract based on the R&D e¤ort -which can be veri…ed from the balance sheet of the upstream …rm, unless fraudulent behaviour is adopted by the latter -appears more reliable an instrument to cope with the issue represented by the vertical externality.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The setup and the analysis of the vertically integrated monopolist are in Section 2. The case of vertical separation with double marginalization is dealt with in Section 3, while Section 4 contains the analysis of the alternative contractual designs based on three di¤erent de…nitions of the two-part tari¤. Concluding remarks are in Section 5.
Benchmark: the vertically integrated monopolist
The model is a variation on the setup introduced by Mussa and Rosen (1978) and Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979) . We assume the market is supplied by a single-product monopoly selling a nondurable good of quality q (t) > 
and -assuming p (t) =q (t) > 1 always -market demand at any time t is
Production takes place at marginal cost c, which can be normalised to zero without further loss of generality. The …rm consists of two vertically related divisions, U (for upstream) and D (for downstream), each investing in R&D aimed at improving the quality level of the product supplied to consumers.
De…ne as k i (t) the instantaneous e¤ort of division i = D; U: If R&D activity takes place at decreasing returns to scale, the total cost function borne by the …rm is
where b is a positive parameter. One can imagine the present setup as describing a situation in which each division cares for an input or component whose quality is crucial in determining the overall quality level of the …nal consumption good. The state dynamics describing the evolution of the state variable q (t) over time is
in which z is a positive constant and > 0 is the decay rate of quality.
The transfer price along the supply chain being nil, the vertically integrated monopolist's instantaneous pro…ts are
and the …rm wants to maximise the discounted pro…t ‡ow
; under the constraints posed by the state equation (2), initial condition q (0) = q 0 > 0; and the appropriate transversality condition to be speci…ed below. Pro…ts are discounted at the constant rate > 0.
The Bellman equation is
where subscript V I mnemonics for vertical integration and V 0 V I (q (t)) @V V I (q (t)) =@q (t). In the remainder, I pose V V I (q (t)) = q (t) + ; so that
Taking the …rst order conditions (FOCs) on fp (t) ; k u (t) ; k d (t)g and solving, one obtains the following triple of optimal feedback controls:
Plugging (6) into (5) and simplifying, one obtains the following equation: 
Firm U controls w and k U ; …rm D controls p and k D . Their respective Bellman equations are:
Proceeding by backward induction, I take w and k U as given and solve …rm D's optimum problem. The relevant FOCs on controls p and k D yield:
where superscript V S stands for vertical separation. Controls (12) can be substituted into (10) together with V D (q) = q (t) + " and V 0 D (q) = ; in such a way that (10) can be rewritten as follows:
This generates the following FOCs: 
and the equilibrium levels of R&D e¤orts and product quality are, respectively:
with k V S U + k V S D < 2k and consequently also q V S < q . Additionally, output x V S = =4 = x =2. As a result, equilibrium channel pro…ts
are lower than . The analysis carried out in this section entails the following:
The double marginalization associated with vertical separation brings about a reduction in R&D e¤orts, quality level and channel pro…ts as compared to the vertically integrated solution.
However, it is also worth noting that, although a hold-up e¤ect is indeed Here I rely on alternative de…nitions of a contract based on two-part tari¤s to illustrate a twofold result: the traditional two-part tari¤ consisting of a …xed fee associated with a wholesale price does not allow the vertically separated …rms to reproduce the performance of the vertically integrated monopolist. Instead, this can be achieved by adopting, alternatively, a control-linear two-part tari¤ (where the control at stake is …rm U 's R&D e¤ort).
In both cases, the fee is accompanied by a wholesale price set at marginal production cost. As mentioned above, the second result is relevant in that the quality level may not be immediately observable or veri…able by the downstream …rm, which would therefore be subject to the risk associated 
The exogenous two-part tari¤
Here I consider the case in which the vertical relation between separated …rms U and D takes the form of a 'classical' two-part tari¤ T = wx + F .
The resulting instantaneous objective functions are therefore the following:
where the …xed component F of the TPT is an exogenous parameter, accompanied by a wholesale price equal to marginal production cost, w = 0.
The FOCs pertaining to …rm D yield the same controls as in (12) . Now, posing w = 0, V D (q) = q + " and V 0 D (q) = and proceeding as in the previous section, it is easily veri…ed that, since U = F bk 2 U ; the optimal R&D e¤ort by …rm U solving its …rst order condition is again k F U = zV 0 U (q) = (2b), superscript F indicating the adoption of a TPT with an exogenous fee.
The partial derivative of the downstream …rm's value function is again
However, …rm U 's Bellman equations simpli…es as follows:
whereby one of the two Riccati equation generated by (21) is
which implies = 0; so that V 0 U (q) = 0 and therefore also k F U = 0. This shows that the exogeneity of the …xed fee appearing in the tari¤ altogether eliminates any R&D incentive upstream. It is also worth stressing that, typically, F should be posed equal to
in order for the upstream …rm to appropriate the revenues generated by sales, but this of course wouldn't do the job of restoring R&D incentives upstream either.
Accordingly, we may claim: 
The control-linear two-part tari¤
The de…nition of the two-part tari¤ is the same as in the previous case.
Therefore, the instantaneous pro…t functions are as in (20) . In this case, however, I will pose F = + k U . Hence, all of the relevant variables and pro…ts will be identi…ed by a superscript k U revealing that the TPT speci…ed in the contract is a function of the upstream …rm's R&D control. Setting w = 0; the optimal controls of …rm D are p V S = q=2 and k k U D = zV 0 D (q) = (2b). Specifying the upstream …rm's value function as V D (q) = q + " and solving the resulting system w.r.t. and "; we obtain: 
whereby the equilibrium quality level is
It is then immediate to check that k k U U = = (2b) and k k U D = k : Hence, we have that k k U U = k and k U U + k U D = at = z 2 =4 ( + ). Firms' pro…ts in steady state are: 
System (28) delivers
The downstream …rm's pro…t simpli…es as follows:
and it is nil in correspondence of
The expressions appearing in (29) Although apparently this type of contract produces the same equilibrium as the one based on a TPT linear in the upstream …rm's control, the approach illustrated in this section is somewhat problematic as it leaves room to a moral hazard problem. If any given quality increase along the supply chain is veri…able (and therefore contractible), then the TPT incorporating (31) represents a feasible e¢ cient solution to the hold-up problem. If not, (31) is a gamble the downstream …rm should not be willing to accept as it exposes the same …rm to an obvious opportunistic behaviour on the part of the upstream supplier.
Concluding remarks
I have investigated the e¢ cient design of the contract based on a two-part tari¤ that should be adopted to lead a supply chain along which qualityimproving investments take place to entirely replicate the performance of a vertically integrated …rm. In particular, the foregoing analysis has shown that there exist two alternative speci…cation of the TPT achieving this outcome:
one contemplates a fee de…ned as a linear function of the upstream R&D endeavour, the other has the fee speci…ed as a linear function of product quality. The latter might not be a feasible solution if quality improvements along the vertical relation are not immediately observable/veri…able, and therefore not contractible, while the adoption of the former hinges upon reliable …nancial reports on the part of the upstream OEM …rm.
Several extensions of the above analysis can be envisaged. First of all, the setup can be extended to allow for oligopolistic competition to take place either downstream or upstream, or in both. Secondly, the presence of some other type of investment, e.g., in cost-reducing innovation, could also be accounted for, as in Lambertini and Orsini (2000; . Thirdly, here I have con…ned my attention to nondurables; using the same approach to analysing contractual design based on TPT's for durables looks like a natural addendum. These tasks are left for future research.
